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The vast majority of pre-Classical and of many Classical economists thought that it was natural to 
incorporate value judgments and norms in their economic reasoning. However, there was a gradual 
dominance of the idea of  a neutral or value-free economic science which gained momentum with 
the second Marginalist generation. More specifically, clear signs of this tendency can be found in 
the  works  of Sidgwick, Pareto and Fisher. The paper examines the process of this change and 
provides possible justifications. In particular, the work discusses  this trend with reference to the 
growing  influence of classical physics, and positivist philosophies of science. Consequently, the 
paper shows that there was a gradual broadening  of the  meaning of the term “value judgments” to 
include mental states and motivations. These developments are essential in the understanding of  the 
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The idea of value-free economics  is an old methodological issue. It has given rise to one of the 
most important controversies in the history of economic thought. The discussion was important 
because it had to do with the scientific nature of economics. One can still find a significant number 
of  methodological works (e.g. Coddington,1972; Gordon, 1977; Sugden, 1981; Colander, 1994)   
which echo this old controversy. Most economists today though, would agree that the claim of an 
economic theory free from values is essential in establishing the scientific nature of the discipline. A 
positive, value-free economics, in the sense of not relying on any particular set of value judgments 
or to any philosophical or psychological framework, is generally seen as the ideal.  This approach 
has crucially influenced important branches of economics such as microeconomic theory. However, 
the current established position was a product of a historical process which given its importance, 
played a significant role in the formation of the body of economic theory. Furthermore, the idea of 
what is value-free economics has changed since its first introduction as a scientific ideal. The nature 
of  this  change  is  also  important  for  understanding  the  present  conception  about  the  scientific 
character  of economics.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to trace back the origins and the development of the tendency towards a 
value-free economic science. In order to understand this process we need to trace the evolution of 
the meaning of the term value-free. Thus the  paper starts with a section discussing the notion and 
the  types  of  objectivity  and  their  historical  evolution.  The  next  section  deals  with  the  gradual 
introduction of the value-free idea in economics which occurred in the classical school. It also 
discusses the  conception of the value-free that classical economists had. Section four  examines the 
change in the idea of what constitutes value-free economics in the Marginal school and also in the  
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Neoclassical school. Finally a concluding section assesses the findings and draws some thoughts 
concerning the nature of value-free economics. 
 
II TYPES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVITY 
 
It is clear that there is a close connection between the concept of objectivity and the idea of value-
free  economics.  As  was  mentioned,  value  free  economics  is  mainly  appreciated  because  it  is 
objective.  Thus  a  discussion  of  the  meaning  of  objectivity  seems  necessary.  Contemporary 
economists and also many scientists conceive the term “objective” as implying neutrality, or in T. 
Nagel’s words : “the view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986). However, it should be pointed out that this 
was not always the meaning of objectivity. Furthermore as it will be  seen, it is only one aspect of 
the notion of objectivity.  
 
Historians  and philosophers of science (especially L. Daston, 1992) have distinguished three types 
of objectivity. The first type has been termed aperspectival objectivity and refers to eliminating 
individual  or  group  idiosyncrasies;  in  other  words  it  relates  to  social  context  and  to  the  ethos 
projected  by  the  researcher.  As  Dear  states,  objectivity  can  be  conceptualized  in  terms  of  its 
opposite, subjectivity, which relates to the perspective of an individual human subject (Dear, 1992, 
p.619).  The  second  type  has    been  called  ontological  objectivity  and  it  relates  to  the  ultimate 
structure  of  reality.  Finally  the  third  type,  mechanical  objectivity,  forbids  judgment  and 




Aperspectival  objectivity  made  its  first  appearance  in  moral  and  aesthetic  philosophy.  It  was 
subsequently imported in to the scientific culture of the natural sciences. Before this introduction, in 
the 17th century, the term objective had to do with objects or with  the truth (Dear,1992). It has been 
maintained that the success in terms of the influence of aperspectival objectivity was due to the 
reorganisation of science. In particular,  the increase in the number of scientists, which took place 
mainly  in  the  nineteenth  century,  required  greater  communication.  Aperspectival  objectivity 
facilitated greater communicability among scientists (Daston, 1992, p.609). It has also been argued 
that the trend towards quantification, which also gained momentum during the same period, has 
been associated with objectivity, not because it mirrors reality but because it serves the ideal of 
communicability (Porter,1992).   
 
The  above  discussion  can  be  connected  to  the  meaning  of  the  term  value-judgments.  The  
conception of many contemporary economists of the term value judgments is that they  are not 
“objective”  statements  in  the  sense  of  aperspectival  objectivity.  E.  Nagel,  however,  has 
distinguished  another  category  of  value-judgments,  the  characterizing  or  methodological  value 
judgments which involve the mode and the  criteria of investigation and also the choice of subject 
matter to be investigated (Nagel, 1961). Although, the role of methodological value-judgments in 
economics has received little attention in the history of economics, there are signs of an increasing 
interest especially with reference to econometrics (e.g. Blaug,1985; Leamer,1983; Mayer, 1993)  
However, as we shall see, the bulk of the discussion in the history of economics has been focused to 





III. THE IDEA OF THE VALUE-FREE IN THE CLASSICAL SCHOOL 
 
In the pre-classical economic thought, the idea of value-free or aperspectival objectivity was not an 
issue. The purpose of the scholastic analysis was not pure scientific curiosity. It was a desire to 
understand what they were called upon to judge from a moral standpoint (Schumpeter, 1954, p.102). 
The best example here is the discussion concerning interest (see for instance, Karayiannis,1995) 
   
As  was  mentioned,  there  was  a  gradual  shift  from  ontological  objectivity  to  aperspectival 
objectivity. One for instance can find clear traces of this in the work of D. Hume. In a statement 
giving advice on how to judge works of Art, Hume states: 
 
“In like manner, when any work is addressed to the public, though I should have a friendship or 
enmity with the author, I must depart from this situation, and, considering myself as a man in 
general, forget if possible my individual being, and my peculiar circumstances”  (Hume 1826, p. 
271). 
 
One has to note here that although Hume seems to advocate aperspectival objectivity, he is not 
entirely  certain  if  it  is  epistemologically  possible.  Subsequent  interpretations  by  economists 
consider Hume to be the first who made a clear separation between positive and normative by 
distinguishing  “ought”  from  “is”.  The  well-known    concept  of  “Hume’s  guillotine”  is  taken  to 
distinguish descriptive statements from norms or ethical pronouncements (Blaug,1980,p.130).  
 
The trend towards aperspectival objectivity took more definite shape in Adam Smith’s work “The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments”.  Discussing the comparison of different interests, Smith writes: 
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“Before  we  can  make  any  proper  comparison  of  those  opposite  interests,  we  must  change  our 
position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor from his, neither with our own eyes 
nor  with  his,  but  from  the  place  and  with  the  eyes  of  a  third  person,  who  has  no  particular 
connection to either, and who judges with impartiality, between us” (Smith, 1976, p.135) 
 
For many 18th century writers such as Smith, scientists (mathematicians, natural philosophers) were 
the  example  of  impartiality  (Daston,  1992,  p.  605).  However,  the  reason  for  this  was  their 
disinterestedness  about  public  opinion  and  their  aloofness  concerning    public  criticism  of  their 
work. 
 
As was realized early on by historians of economic thought (see for instance Gide and Rist 1915, 
p.350), Senior is considered to be one of the  first thinkers who brought the distinction between 
positive and normative in economics. In a representative statement he writes: “the conclusion of the 
economist whatever be their generality and their truth, do not authorize him in adding a single 
syllable of advice” and also that “ the business of the political economist is neither to recommend 
nor to neglect, but to state general principles” (quoted in Gray,1931, p.273). 
 
Mill’s ideas were in the same intellectual climate. He emphasized the distinction between “art” and 
the “science” of economics. In a similar manner to Senior, Mill conceived art as containing ethical 
premises  (Hutchison,  1964,  pp.29-31).  This  was  combined  with  his  conviction  about 
methodological monism (Mill, 1874, p.143). His belief was that economics should be developed in 
the same way as more positive sciences like geometry (Mill, 1874, p.144). He was one of the first 
economists to explicitly state that positive  sciences should be the model for economics. 
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Cairnes continues the tradition of Mill and Senior. He believed that political economy is exactly the 
same kind of science as chemistry, dynamics and physiology (Cairnes, 1875,p.20). This parallelism 
of political economy with natural sciences leads to the idea that political economy is a neutral 
science and the political economist is an objective scientist. As he states: 
 
“In the first place, then, you will remark that, as thus conceived, Political Economy stands apart 
from all particular systems of social or industrial existence...But this notwithstanding, the science is 
neutral,  as  between  social  schemes,  in  this  important  sense.  It  pronounces  no  judgment  on  the 
worthiness or desirableness of the ends aimed at such systems” (Cairnes,1875, p.20).  
  
One could also add here the emergence of a trend of this period  to emphasize the autonomy of 
economics as against the other social or moral sciences (Schumpeter, 1954, p.535) . 
 
In general, the idea of aperspectival objectivity was associated with the distinction between art and 
the science of economics. The term “art” for the classical economists mainly meant the corpus of 
political and social views. However, they did not think that the use of concepts like pleasure, pain, 
utility  and  ideas  like  the  Greatest  Happiness  principle  were  in  any  sense  value-judgments  
(Drakopoulos, 1991).  
  
IV.  THE VALUE-FREE IN MARGINALISM AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
 
A. Marginalism 
In the first marginalist generation, one can see the increasing attention to issues relating to the 
nature of economics  as a discipline. One of the founders of  the marginalist school, W. S. Jevons,  
viewed economics as basically a mathematical pursuit, its scope narrowly defined to the mechanics  
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of self-interest and utility (Winch,1972,p.328). His was a great believer in methodological monism 
and also in the idea that Astronomy was the perfect model of science, something that economics 
should aspire to become (Jevons,1971,p.6, 25).  In his view, exact science meant the exclusion of all 
normative or political elements. As a consequence of this belief, he omitted the term “Political” 
from the second edition of his Theory of Political Economy. In spite of his conviction of a neutral 
and exact science of economics, Jevons defined economics in terms of subjective sensations like 
pleasure and pain (Jevons, 1871,p.44). 
 
In a similar manner, L. Walras believed that the use of mathematics would make pure economics a 
science of absolute exactness like physics or mechanics. (Walras, 1965, p.47-48). Thus he thought 
of  economics  “as  a  pure  science  which  was  distinguished  by  the  complete  indifference  to 
consequences, good or bad, with which it carries on the pursuit of pure truth” (quoted in Winch, 
1972, p.329). 
 
C. Menger, the third of the first marginalist generation also thought that  economics can be as exact 
science as the physical sciences (Menger,1963,p.218). His conviction of pure economics can also be 
seen in his well-known methodological debate with the German Historical school. His main concern 
there  was  to  defend  pure  political  economy  against  the  attacks  of  the  historical  economists 
(Schumpeter,1954). 
 
In  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  second  marginalist  generation  of  economists 
emerged.  At  the  same  time,    the  influence  of  positivism  as  the  dominant  scientific  philosophy 
became more apparent. The starting point of positivism was that the enormous success of physical 
sciences meant that their scientific methodology was the ideal for the rest of  the  disciplines. One of  
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the main components of the physical sciences methodology was the rejection of  all normative, 
ethical or metaphysical elements (for a discussion see Mirowski,1989). Thus the idea of a value-free 
economics became more prevalent in the writings of the second marginalist generation. This must 
also  be  seen  in  connection  to  the  increasing  use  of  mathematics  in  economic  theory  (see  also 
Mirowski, 1991). However, there was also a  major development in the sense that psychological 
elements  started  to  be  considered  as  value-laden  and  therefore  unacceptable  in  the  corpus  of 
economic theory. The implication here is that  there was little interest in developments in the field 
of psychology, a tendency that can also be found in subsequent   economists (for a discussion of 
anti-psychologism among economists, see Coats,1976).  
 
In 1883, Sidgwick summarized the dominant  ideas concerning the role of values in economics. 
Continuing the positivist tradition, he re-emphasized the distinction between “what is” and “what 
ought to  be”. Sidgwick, however,  accepted  the existence of “Ultimate Values”  which prevail in 
one’s culture and at one’s own time. The science of economics corresponds to the “what is” part. 
The  art  of  economics  whose  propositions  were  precepts  corresponds  to  these  Ultimate  Values 
(Sidgwick,1883). 
 
Thus,  economists of the second marginalist generation started to become much more aware of the 
methodological  discussion  concerning  value-judgments.    P.  Wicksteed,  for  instance,    is  quite 
anxious  that  his  economic  ideas  not  to  be  associated  with  “a  hedonistic  theory  of  ethics” 
(Wicksteed,  1933,  p.434).  In  the  same  climate  V.  Pareto  parallels  economics  with  rational 
mechanics  which  in  methodological  terms  implies  that  “it  deduces  its  results  from  experience 
without bringing in any metaphysical entity” (Pareto, 1971, p.113). Thus Pareto clearly advocated 
methodological monism. Furthermore, he attempted to reconstruct marginal utility theory without  
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using the concept of utility, but his own concept of ophelimity. One could explain this attitude in 
terms of suspicion that utility as a term had no positive status. Another indication for this, was 
Pareto’s  reservations about the scientific status of interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
 
In  the  work  of  I  Fisher,  one  can  discern  the  first  concrete  attempt  to  include  psychological 
assumptions in the definition of values. For Fisher, positive economics should be free from any 
psychological assumptions too. As he writes: 
 
“But the economist need not envelop his own science in the hazes of ethics, psychology, biology 
and metaphysics  (Fisher, 1965, p.23). 
 
Fisher seems to be unhappy with the term utility,  because it is the heritage of Bentham and his 
theory of pleasure and pains (Fisher, 1965, p.23). In general, Fisher was one of the first economists 
of this period to express explicitly his views about the utilitarian bias of economics and to call for 
its abandonment
1. The important point here is that, concepts (such as utility) which the previous 
marginalists thought of as positive or value-free, gradually started to be seen as inappropriate for a 
positive science of economics.   
 
b) Post-Marginalist Developments 
In the first decades of this century, the discussions among economists concerning objectivity and 
value judgments started to be influenced by the increasingly popular  scientific philosophy of logical 
positivism. The verification principle which stated that a sentence has no meaning if  it can not be 
verified either analytically or empirically, was in the core of logical positivism (see Hanfling, 1981). 
Their attitude towards value judgments is summarized by R. Carnap: “Value judgments have no  
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theoretical sense. Therefore we assign them to the realm of metaphysics” (Carnap, 1981, p.150). 
Logical positivism viewed physics as the scientific ideal and advocated methodological monism. 
 
J. N. Keynes developed further the theme of art and science in economics that we find in the work 
of previous economists. In particular, he distinguished three categories: a) positive science, which is 
defined as a body of a systematized knowledge concerning what is. The  object of positive science is 
the establishment of uniformities, b) normative science, which is a body of systematized knowledge 
relating to criteria of what ought to be, the  object of which is the determination of ideals and c) art, 
which is the formulation of precepts (Keynes, 1904, p.34).  The second category is the novel point 
here since the previous economists would not accept the possibility of a normative science. Keynes 
thought that: 
 
“We ought at least to recognize as fundamental a positive science of political economy which is 
concerned purely with what is and which seeks to determine economic laws” (Keynes, 1904, p.36). 
 
At this point it might be useful to  point out that Keynes’s categories reinforced the normative-
positive distinction which became quite influential in the writings of subsequent economists (see 
Hutchison, 1981,p.56). 
 
Over  the  same  period,  M  Weber  provided  a  more  general  discussion  about  the  role  of  value-
judgments in social sciences. Weber believed that all sciences are based on particular methods of 
investigations which are bound to conceptual schemes characterizing different epochs (as was seen, 
this  is  close  to  what  Nagel  termed  methodological  value  judgments).  He  believed  though  that 
economics can be as objective as the exact sciences if it follows  the doctrine of “Wertfreiheit” 
                                                                                   
1 The question whether Fisher and Pareto were succesful in excluding these elements, is another issue which has been  
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(freedom from values) as a methodological ideal. His definition of the Wertfreiheit was the freedom 
from all individual contingencies. Thus, he believed in the possibility  of a value-free social science 
(Weber,  1984).  Unlike  many  of  his  contemporaries  however,    Weber  was  suspicious  of 
methodological monism because he thought that there are essential differences between what he 
called Cultural sciences (i.e. economics) and exact natural  sciences. 
 
After Keynes and Weber,  Robbins’ methodological work in 1932 was the systematized exposition 
of the prevailing ideas of the period. Robbins’  methodological aim was the construction, through 
the application of the scientific philosophy of logical positivism, of a positive economic science.  
Robbins thought that the psychological elements that were commonplace in the work of the first 
marginalists did not belong to a value-free positive economics (Robbins, 1932, pp.83-86). Thus, 
mental states and motivations were thought to be somehow unscientific. A representative example 
of this line of thought is found in his view concerning the possibility of interpersonal comparisons 
of utility. As it is known, most  marginalist economists accepted the possibility of comparing the 
utilities among individuals. Robbins, however, rejects them by referring to scientific validity: 
 
“I still cannot believe that it is helpful to speak as if interpersonal comparisons of utility rest upon 
scientific foundations” (Robbins, 1938, p.640)   
 
The influence of Robbins’s ideas on the issue of psychological value judgments became apparent in 
theoretical microeconomics. In particular, Hicks and Allen in 1934 attempted to set the basis for an 
objective microeconomic theory, free from any psychological assumptions (Hicks and Allen,1934). 
This was intensified a few years later with Hicks’ “Value and Capital”, in which he aimed to purify 
                                                                                   
dealt elsewhere (see for instance Drakopoulos,1991)  
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the  basic  marginalist  concepts  (of  mainly  Jevons  and  Walras)    of  the  their  psychological 
connotations.  This aim is stated clearly in the following passage: 
 
“If one is utilitarian in philosophy, one has a perfect right to be a utilitarian in one’s economics. But 
if one is not (and few people are nowadays) one has also the right to an economics free from 
utilitarian assumptions” (Hicks,1946, p.18) 
 
Thus  Hicks  constructs  indifference  curves  which  show  combination  of  goods  for  which  the 
consumer is indifferent and the marginalist utility space is replaced by a commodity space, and 
marginal utility by the marginal rate of substitution. His positivist orientation prevents him from 
giving any reason for the existence of indifference curves and he simply takes them as given. In the 
same spirit, he rejects the idea of interpersonal comparisons of utility on the grounds that it would 
involve a value judgment (Hicks, 1939,p.697). 
 
The trend towards a value-free theory continued in the work of P. Samuelson. Samuelson, however, 
is not satisfied by Hicks’ attempt to construct a value-free theory of consumer behaviour. In an early 
article he expresses his doubts about Hicks’ and Allen’s reconstruction of utility theory in terms of 
marginal rate of substitution: 
 
“It is clear that even the most modern analysis shows vestigial traces of the utility concept....The 
introduction  and  meaning  of  the  marginal rate of substitution as an entity independent of  any 




Samuelson tries to get away from psychological concepts by accepting observed behaviour only. 
The  revealed  preference  theory  is  based  on  a    few  basic  postulates  which  describe  “rational” 
economic agents. Samuelson’s revealed preference theory is the basis for modern theory of choice.
2 
 
Apart  from  developments  in  consumer  theory,  the  current  dominant  methodological  position 
concerning  positive economics rests upon the exclusion of all ethical, normative and psychological 
elements. The basic methodological justification for this is that the  positive-normative distinction 
helps economics achieve the objective status of the physical sciences (see Friedman, 1984, Lipsey, 
1983  and  Machlup,  1984).  At  this  point  it  has  to  be  mentioned  that  the  above  position  is  not 
universally accepted (the controversy over Myrdal’s (1953) thesis is a good guide). Furthermore, 
some  economists  such  as  Hutchison  have  argued  that  value-judgments  occur  in  all  sciences 
economics included, implying that it might be methodologically impossible to exclude them (e.g. 
Hutchison, 1964). 
 
Thus one can maintain that the concept of objectivity as it is conceived by economists has been 
modified substantially. The exclusion of political and ethical elements which initially was thought 
to be adequate, is no longer considered acceptable. In the historical process, psychological elements 
acquired a normative status and thus became value-laden. One however, has to mention that the 
issue of psychological elements has not be settled. The history and the current ongoing discussion 
concerning  the  possibility  of  interpersonal  comparisons  of  utilities  is  the  best  example.  More 
specifically, a substantial number  of welfare economists are not willing to completely exclude the 
possibility  of  comparability  (for  an  overview  see  Drakopoulos,  1989).  Furthermore,    one  can 
observe  a  tendency  towards  the  gradual  readmission  of  mental  states  and  sensations  in  recent 
                         
2 It has to be mentioned however, that Hicks’ and especially Samuelson’s attempts to exclude psychological concepts 
have been challenged (see Wong,1978)  
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developments in the theory of choice.  Regret theory which is based on the concepts of pleasurable 
and  painful sensations is a representative example (Loomes and Sugden, 1983).  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
One of the main aims of this paper was to examine the development of the concept of the value-free 
in the history of economics. The paper traced the first attempts towards a value-free economics in 
the writings of the classical economists. It was seen that the trend towards  value-free economics 
was  closely  connected  to  the  discipline’s  striving  for  objectivity.  However,  the  conception  of 
objectivity that prevailed in the classical period was what has been termed aperspectival objectivity. 
Aperspectival  objectivity    made  its  first  appearance  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century 
especially in moral and aesthetic philosophy. It was gradually imported in the social sciences by 
Hume and Adam Smith. Consequently, Senior and Mill gave it a more concrete meaning in the 
context of economic theory, which basically referred to the exclusion of politics, ethics and norms 
from  economic  discourse.  The  trend  continued  with  the  appearance  of  the  first  marginalist 
generation. It was also assisted by the increasing dominance of the natural sciences’ methodological 
ideal. With the coming of the second marginalist generation, there were the first signs that the 
economists’ conception  of the value-free was broadening to include psychological elements. The 
paper argued that the increasing influence of positivist scientific philosophies was the main reason 
for this shift. These signs took definite form with the works of  Fisher, J. N. Keynes, and Robbins. 
Consequently, the theories of choice of Hicks and Samuelson attempted to rebuilt economic theory 
independently from standard marginalist concepts. The main reason for this was that marginalist 
theory  involved  psychological  concepts  which  were  deemed  as  value-laden  and  therefore 
unscientific.   
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In general, one can observe a broadening of the  term value-free: it started with the exclusion of 
politics and norms, then it proceeded with exclusion of psychological assumptions and finally with 
the expulsion of mental states. This broadening might be seen  as an important factor driving the 
reconstruction of microeconomic theory which took  place in the first decades  of this century. 
However,  it  should  be  noted  that  there  are  signs  in  recent  developments  in  economics  which 
indicate that this continuous broadening is not entirely unproblematic in terms of explanatory power 
(the ongoing debate concerning interpersonal comparisons of utility is indicative). This idea can be 
linked to the discussion concerning the methodological possibility of excluding value-judgments not 
only from economics but also of scientific discourse in general. Thus,  it is hoped that the discussion 
showed  that  the  change  of  the  meaning  of  the  value-free  was  an  important  element  in  the 
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